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INTRODUCTION
Melvyn R. Durchslag*
This symposium was conceived in 1987, the bi-centennial year
of our Constitution. It has been a year which has seen printed ver-
sions of the Constitution on backs of cereal boxes, feature writers'
accounts of constitutional history in local newspapers, and three
minute blurbs of our greatest moments sandwiched between prime
time television shows. It has also been a year in which academic
journals have explored in detail, not only the marvels of our consti-
tution and our resultant progress in political and human rights, but
also its darker side.1 This symposium, however, is unique in that it
adds a dimension to the study of our Constitution which tends to be
largely ignored by current legal scholarship. This symposium con-
centrates on individual liberties which are guaranteed outside the
Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments; liberties which are
guaranteed in the text of the original, unamended document.
Why devote a symposium to rights such as those found in the
contract clause or the privileges and immunities clause of article IV;
provisions not often the current focal point of either constitutional
litigation or scholarship? If asked to respond to the appropriate bi-
centennial question, "whether the Constitution measures up to our
political and moral aspirations," more than likely most Constitu-
tional scholars would begin searching the experiences under the Bill
of Rights and, later, the fourteenth amendment.2 Yet substantively,
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; B.S. (1962), J.D. (1965) North-
western University.
1. See, e.g., Essays: Is The Constitution Working?, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 321 (1987);
Symposium: "To Endure For Ages to Come:" A Bicentennial View of the Constitution, 65
N.C.L. REv. 879 (1987).
2. See generally, M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INQURY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY MAKING BY
THE JUDICIARY (1982).
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the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment give us little by
way of insight into the structural relationship between the federal
government and the states and the impact of that relationship on
protecting fundamental human values. So while undoubtedly we
can learn more of the relationship between our moral values and the
rights we accord individuals from the values implicit in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, we are better able to evaluate Madison's
thesis that diffusion of power protects individual liberties by looking
at the subjects which these five scholars have studied.
High school civics informs us of the general structure of the
Constitution: (1) it diffuses power among three branches of the fed-
eral government and also between the federal government and the
states, and (2) it presupposes a republican, representative form of
government. In addition however, the original document contains
no less than thirteen specific protections of individual liberties. For
example, the federal government may not suspend the writ of
habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion, require reli-
gious tests as a condition for holding public office, or deny a crimi-
nal defendant's right to a jury trial. The states may not impair the
obligation of contracts nor may they discriminate against citizens of
other states by denying them the privileges and immunities afforded
their own citizens. Neither the federal government nor the states
may enact bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. This symposium
concentrates on four of those provisions-the habeas corpus, privi-
leges and immunities, contract, and religious test clause. The first
three are, to one degree or another, grist for current litigation. The
fourth, by contrast, has never been used to invalidate a federal oath
and has received hardly a judicial mention in thirty-seven years.
Yet, as Professor Gerard Bradley persuasively argues, the history of
the religious test clause sheds new light upon the important but en-
igmatic religion clause of the first amendment.
The variety of issues discussed in this symposium is apparent
from the title page. Other than the fact that all four clauses appear
in the same document one might wonder why these five scholarly
efforts appear under the same masthead. One reason is historical;
each gives a peek into the same period of our constitutional history.
Of greater importance I think, and the theme which binds the col-
lective work, is the insight which the authors give us about the rela-
tionship between the locus of governmental power and individual
liberties.
There is a singular ambiguity to these four provisions. Each
reads like it could have fit just as easily in the Bill of Rights.
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Habeas corpus would be as comfortable in the fifth amendment as
in article I, section 9. The religious test clause certainly seems to be
comprehended either by the establishment clause or the free exer-
cise clause of the first amendment, maybe both.3 The contract
clause, particularly after the Court in Fletcher v. Peck4 interpreted
it to apply to property interests, could have been understood (albeit
not until after 1868) in terms of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Even the privileges and immunities clause
(again after 1868) could have been comprehended by substantive
due process if one were to accept Chester Antieu's argument that
article IV, section 2, clause 1 invested all citizens with natural
("certain inalienable") rights. But that misses the point. Reading
all five articles together, one is left with the question whether these
limitations on governmental authority were imposed primarily out
of concern for the individual or, like the rest of the document, were
included because of structural concerns. As a comparison of
Professors Thomas Merrill and Robert Palmer's papers on the con-
tract clause plainly demonstrates, how one comes out on that issue
may determine whether any particular contract will be protected
from state interference by article I, section 10; it will determine the
rationale for protection.
Professor Merrill focuses on the Court's current position that
obligees under public contracts are afforded greater protection by
the contract clause than obligees under private contracts. This he
says, "turn[s] the contract clause of both the framers and the post-
Charles River Bridge era on its head." Merrill argues that underly-
ing the Court's present contract clause analysis is a "sweeping [gen-
eralization] about the superiority of public ordering relative to
private ordering" which has "no place under the contract clause."
He argues, instead, for a system of analyzing contract clause cases
which undertakes a "serious comparative analysis of the merits of
markets versus regulation in different institutional settings."
This position is 180 degrees from that of Professor Robert
Palmer who argues that in cases like Blaisdell, the contract clause
must be read as an absolute bar to state regulation. He comes to
this position from reading the history of the contract clause in a far
different way than does Professor Merrill. Taking what he de-
scribes as a contextual approach, Palmer concludes that article I,
3. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (relied on the free exercise clause, but cited
establishment clause cases, to strike down a Maryland statute which required an oath af-
firming a belief in God as a condition of becoming a notary public).
4. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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section 10 was not intended to vindicate individual rights but rather
was intended to keep the states from interfering with Congress'
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. He reasons that
in the same way article I, section 9 was included to restrict federal
powers "that were the most dangerous ways the federal government
would undermine the states as independent policy centers... article
I, section 10 is that set of restrictions on state government necessary
to insure that the federal government was a vigorous center of in-
dependent policy." As he later notes, the contract clause is "an
exception to state power to preserve federal power." This leads
Palmer to conclude that contract clause protections should be ex-
tended only to those contracts in which the federal government has
some interstate or foreign commerce interest. He thus believes that
Fletcher v. Peck's holding that vested property interests are pro-
tected by the contract clause is wrong.
Professor Merrill agrees that the current misinterpretation of
the contract clause stems from Fletcher v. Peck. But for Merrill the
mistake was in holding that the contract clause applied to public as
well as private contracts. They agree on another point as well,
although apparently disagree on its significance. While Professor
Merrill's arguments presuppose that the purpose of the contract
clause was to vindicate, as Madison put it in the Federalist No. 44,
"the first principles of the social compact,"5 he does admit to a sig-
nificant federalism value as well: "The framers were realistic about
the need for a strong government but also the dangers of a strong
government. The jurisprudence of the contract clause should reflect
the same degree of realism."
It may appear to be a strange leap from two differing views of
the contract clause to Professor Gerard Bradley's discussion of the
"No Religious Test Clause." But the dual nature of the original
document as a structural outline of a federal republic and an articu-
lation of fundamental individual freedoms makes this not so. Pro-
fessor Bradley describes article VI, clause 3's ambivalence of
purpose. On its face, the no religious test clause appears to be a
narrow free exercise clause. However, tracing the history of reli-
gious oaths as a condition for public office in the states, Professor
Bradley asks how it could be that those who gathered in Philadel-
phia could be so determined to rid religion from the federal govern-
ment at the same time they displayed an equal determination to
retain religion as part of their respective state governments. The
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 279 (J. Madison) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1902).
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answer he finds is not in any commitment to principles of individual
religious liberty but rather in a fear of federal power. He points out
the irony of article VI, clause 3: "[b]y their exaggerated 'worst case'
scenarios, antifederalist rhetoricians instilled that sense of potential
minority status in the ordinary Protestant essential to seeing article
VI as a self-protective devise .... They suggested a federal estab-
lishment of Presbyterianism or Anglicanism. They repeatedly de-
manded a general prohibition of sect privileges." 6 Concluding, he
observed: "They [the framers not the anti-federalists] undervalued
the bitter which they served to the people-a 'secular' Constitution
with no taste of religiosity to it-with the 'sweet': religious liberty
assertedly secured by the federal disability on the subject." By
preventing the federal government from requiring a religious test,
article VI disabled federal establishment, thus helping ensure the
ability of the states to continue their existing religious practices.
Applying this reasoning to the first amendment, Bradley argues
that current establishment clause doctrine, or as he calls it post-
1947 [Everson] doctrine, is incorrect for two reasons, both based on
Madison's Federalist No. 10. First, current establishment doctrine
ignores the fact that our pluralistic political process will not long
tolerate governmental endorsement of particular religious views or
even sectarian views at all. Indeed, Professor Bradley opines that
"it has been the political process which has yielded the most impor-
tant victory for religious freedom in our day-the statutory prohibi-
tion on religious discrimination in the workplace." Second, current
establishment doctrine is off the mark because it assumes that polit-
ical divisiveness over religion is an evil which cannot be tolerated
under the establishment clause. Quite the contrary according to
Professor Bradley; divisiveness should be looked on as a positive
good, something which assures religious freedom by ensuring that
no one religious view will win out over another.
Article I, section 9's prohibition of suspending the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, textually, has two things in common with the no
religious test clause of article VI; it applies only against the federal
government and it appears to be a vindication of fundamental
human liberty. Indeed, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, quoting
Blackstone, describes it as " 'the most celebrated writ in the English
law' ". Dating back to the Magna Carta, the "Great Writ" is the
procedural device whereby the fundamental human liberty, the
right not to be held against one's will without just cause, can be
6. Emphasis in original.
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vindicated. What then does this have to do with structural con-
cerns? Everything according to Professor Chemerinsky. As he
points out, the right to habeas corpus was given by common law in
some states before the Constitution and in others it was granted
"constitutionally" in colonial charters. But, "Parliament frequently
suspended the writ... during the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries" and the "[f]ramers feared that Congress might suspend the
states' ability to grant habeas corpus, in the same way that Parlia-
ment had suspended habeas in the colonies." Such a suspension by
Congress would "prevent state courts from releasing individuals
wrongfully imprisoned." This explains why, despite how central to
normative concepts of justice the writ was, the states were not simi-
larly restricted by including the same provision in article I, section
10.
The brief review of the previous three papers establishes, I think,
that provisions even partially conceived out of structural concerns
can never shake loose from those moorings. So it is with Professor
Chemerinsky's analysis of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. As he says:
"Decisions regarding habeas corpus turn on the most basic and dif-
ficult questions in American society: how should power be allo-
cated between the federal and state governments? What is the
appropriate division of powers between Congress and the federal
judiciary in Constitutional cases?" With respect to the federalism
question, Professor Chemerinsky, implicitly agreeing with Professor
Bradley, argues that friction between state and federal courts is not
a federalism "bad" but rather a federalism "good." The "very
existence of federal courts, and of most federal jurisdiction, is based
on a distrust of state courts." However, Chemerinsky ultimately
parts philosophic company with Bradley (and probably Merrill as
well). Even if a legitimate federalism concern exists, Chemerinsky
would resolve the structural/individual liberties conflict in favor of
the latter: "Even if federal courts create friction ... protecting a
wrongfully incarcerated individual is more important than main-
taining harmony between levels of government."
Finally, Professor David Bogen analyzes the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV, section 2, clause 1. Of the four clauses
discussed in this symposium, this most clearly seems to be born out
of structural rather than individual liberties concerns. But, like the
other provisions, this too is ambiguous. As noted above, Professor
Chester Antieu argued that the privileges and immunities clause
was a means of conferring "natural rights" on citizens. Even Pro-
fessor Bogen, who ultimately rejects Antieu's position, at least gar-
[Vol. 37:589
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ners historical support for the proposition that the privileges and
immunities clause has substantive content. As Bogen demonstrates,
both the concept and language of privileges and immunities can be
traced to colonial charters which granted rights of Englishmen to
colonists. The Continental Congress in 1774 expanded those rights
to include "rights by the law of nature as well as under the principle
of the English Constitution and the colonial charters." Bogan con-
cludes, however, that the weight of the evidence supports a struc-
tural approach to article IV, section 2, clause 1. The rights granted
in colonial charters generally prohibited one colonist from being
treated as an alien in another colony. The single bond recognized
uniformly in all colonial charters was that the colonist were all Eng-
lish citizens owing fealty to the English king. The period of confed-
eration left somewhat of a hiatus because the revolution did not
replace the king with a similar, and singular, national sovereign.
Thus it was natural to read substantive content into the privileges
and immunities clause of the Articles of Confederation in order to
give it any meaning at all. As Bogen suggests however, a (the?)
major change brought about by the Constitution was the establish-
ment of a direct link between the individual and a national govern-
ment, strangely reminiscent of the colonial period. "The role once
played by the king in uniting the colonies under a single citizenship
was now taken over by the national government." It was the privi-
leges and immunities clause which gave "content to citizenship in
the United States."
Bogen thus comes out the same way on the privileges and im-
munities clause as Professor Palmer comes out on the contract
clause-structural concerns predominate over concerns for individ-
ual liberty. Similar to Professor Palmer's reading of the contract
clause, acceptance of Professor Bogen's reading of the privileges
and immunities clause would certainly change the analysis of cer-
tain issues and perhaps the result as well. For example, he agrees
with Justice O'Connor that Zobel v. Williams7 should have been
decided under the privileges and immunities clause. He would simi-
larly analyze Shapiro v. Thompson.8 Thus Professor Bogen would
at least prefer, if not strictly adhere to, a structural approach in
deciding cases raising rights of travel and settlement, those which
most closely resemble the framers' concerns with privileges and im-
7. 457 U.S. 55, 71 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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munities. He would avoid the more normative equal protection
analysis which the Court has used in those cases.
Only Professor Chemerinsky seems to prefer an individual liber-
ties approach to a clause which is founded in structural concerns.
But the prohibition on suspending habeas corpus is unique. First,
its historical importance far exceeds its function as an instrumental
device by which substantive rights are protected; it has a life, cer-
tainly a symbolic life, of its own. And second, habeas issues most
often arise in contexts which make compromise between structural
and individual liberties concerns difficult. Sometimes one simply
has to make the hard choice.
